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I. INTRODUCTION
Growing reliance on big data and predictive analyticsl throughout
society is bringing with it changes in an abundance of fields and will
soon impact all walks of life. Specifically, automated models which
analyze vast amounts of personal data will play a central role in the
realm of decision making. At various junctures, society is introducing
fully automated decision-making measures in both the private and
public sectors, and additional models will be sure to follow. For
instance, algorithms are used to establish the level of credit applicants
will receive and the interest they will be charged.2 We are also
witnessing far more instances in which algorithms merely provide the
human decision-maker with advice and recommendations. For
example, an algorithm is used to furnish judges with recommendations
as to the extent of the sentences convicted felons must serve.3
The power of "mere" automated recommendations must not be
underestimated, even at this early juncture. Automated advice will
often be followed by humans, given the powerful allure of computerized
decisions and their appearance of precision and flawlessness, as
opposed to human fallibility. Arguably, in professional settings where
deciders might be held accountable after the fact, humans will follow
automated advice to an even greater extent. This is due to the deciders'
concern with being held liable for errors resulting from their reliance
on personal discretion. Furthermore, reliance on such automated
recommendation might still prove to be the rational move for the
decider, even if she speculates that the automated recommendation
resulted from or will lead to an error. When doing so, the responsibility
for deferring to this erroneous output could be shirked, as the decider
could claim, after the fact, that the reason for the error "was not me; it
was the machine's fault."
This Essay addresses the impact of automated recommendations
and possible policy responses to the changes they bring about, while
focusing on the specific subtopics of anti-discrimination theory and
policy. On the most basic level, the discussion will focus on automated
decisions that involve instances in which the lives of individuals are
I See Dennis Hirsch, Predictive Analytics Law and Policy: A New Field Emerges, 14 I/S:
J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. Soc'Y 1, 1 (2018).
2 Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, On Social Credit and the Right to Be
Unnetworked, COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 339, 357-65 (2016).
3 State v. Loomis, 2016 WI 68, ¶ 92, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016).
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directly and substantially impacted4 (e.g. credit, employment,
insurance, the judiciary, and the military). This is often the situation in
instances involving allocation5 of goods and services.
Predictive modeling has generated a rich discussion as to the
various benefits and disadvantages of these measures. Given the
importance of data driven processes, they are closely scrutinized from
various perspectives and examined as to whether they generate
outcomes which prove efficient and fair. An additional dimension
unfolding in the scholarship addresses whether the processes prove to
be respectful of the human rights of those affected by the allocation.
Regarding these perspectives, predictive modeling carries the promise
of providing several advantages. Data analytics can enhance efficiency
by quickly generating innovative processes, leading to relatively
accurate decisions while accounting for all relevant factors.
Furthermore, algorithmic decisions might promote fairness by
enabling judgments which are detached from the ills' of human
decisions and cognition, such as predictable and systematic biases
which often have an adverse effect on minorities. 6 In terms of basic and
human rights, equality and even privacy (for those finding analysis via
machine to be less intrusive than human scrutiny)7 might also be
enhanced by the growing use of these measures.
However, algorithmic-driven decisions feature a variety of
disadvantages. They are at times error-ridden and . subject to
manipulation, leading to inefficient and unfair outcomes.8 They are
often opaque, generating processes locked into "black boxes." When
this is the case, it is very difficult for those affected by the process to
4 See Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, art. 22, 2016 O.J.
(L 119) 1, 46 [hereinafter General Data Protection Regulation], for a similar regulatory
focus.
5 See generally Ronen Perry & Tal Z. Zarsky, Queues in Law, 99 IOWA L. REv. 1595, 1595-
96 (2014) (discussing various allocative settings and tools for engaging in such allocation).
6 Tal Z. Zarsky, Automated Prediction: Perception, Law and Policy, 15(9) COMM. OF THE
ACM 33, 35 (2012).
7 See Tal Z. Zarsky, Governmental Data Mining and Its Alternatives, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV.
285, 320 (2011); Mathew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IowA L.
REv. 581, 602-09 (2011).
8 See CATHY ONEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCION 124, 155 (2016). -
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properly understand it, thus compromising, among other things, their
rights of due process (when such rights exist).9 The use of predictive
analytics has also raised concerns of privacy violations and disrespect
to one's autonomy, as well as the fear that it enables sophisticated
forms of manipulation. o Finally, the use of algorithmic processes has
raised concerns that they generate unacceptable, and at times even
novel, forms of discrimination.
The study of algorithmic-based and algorithmic-driven
discrimination has drawn substantial interest in the last few years. The
discussion crosses over several disciplines and examines a variety of
processes. Computer scientists have studied whether such
discrimination is unfolding and how it might be proven.'" These studies
noted the challenge of identifying such discrimination and its cause,
and even offered various remedies. Legal scholars2 and others in the
social sciences have also joined the discussion while setting forth
various contributions. Some of these issues were already echoed by
policymakers.13 This Essay will strive to further enrich the growing
corpus of work related to predictive analytics addressing the specter of
discrimination (while partially relying upon this author's earlier
9 See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK Box SOCIETY (2015).
-0 See Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014).
11 See Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, DATA PRIVACY LAB (Jan. 28,
2013), https://dataprivacylab.org/projects/onlineads/1o71-1.pdf
[https://permacc/5FHX-UUGM]; Hannah Devlin, Discrimination by Algorithm:
Scientists Devise Test to DetectAI Bias, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2o16/dec/19/discrimination-by-algorithm-
scientists-devise-test-to-detect-ai-bias [https://perma.cc/DCJ9-VHGE].
12 See Danielle K. Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014); Kate Crawford & Jason Shultz, Big
Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55
B.C. L. REV. 93,99 (2014).
13 Edith Ramirez, FTC Chairwoman, Keynote Address at the Technology Policy Institute
Aspen Forum: The Privacy Challenges of Big Data: A View From the Lifeguard's Chair 7-8
(Aug. 19, 2013) (transcript available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public statements/privacy-challenges-
big-data-view-lifeguard%E2%8o%99s-chair/13o819bigdataaspen.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MC7B-EG7P]); Sari Horwitz, Eric Holder: Basing Sentences on Data
Analysis Could Prove Unfair to Minorities, WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-attorney-general-eric-
holder-urges-against-data-analysis-in-criminal-sentencing/2014/o8/o1/92dof7ba-199o-
11e4-85b6-cl45e622637 story.html [https://perma.cc/2GCL-Z2821.
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work).'4 It will do so by illuminating several theoretical justifications of
anti-discrimination theory and policy, and the way they are challenged
by the novel practices arising. In other words, the Essay's central
contribution is applying existing theory to novel practices, and by doing
so, trying to establish the next mandatory regulatory steps to be taken.
Given the breadth and richness of the theoretical aspects, the
analysis will focus on the normative level, leaving the important
doctrinal analysis for another day.'5 In Section II, this Essay provides
the foundations for the discussion, while defining discrimination and
its key components. It further provides the basic deontological and
consequentialist justifications for anti-discrimination policy. Section
III moves to apply these definitions and justifications to the age of
predictive analytics, while exploring when and how rules prohibiting
discriminatory intent and outcomes could be justified, and providing
general recommendations (Sectionll.A). Finally (in Section III.B), the
analysis explores whether the definition of social groups which must be
protected from discriminatory acts should be amended given new
social and technological trends.
II. BASICS: DEFINITIONS AND THEORIES
A. Defining Discrimination
To properly launch our discussion, let us first further define its
scope. For that, I start with the definition of discrimination itself.
Discrimination has proved to be an allusive concept which
philosophers and legalists struggle to define. In simple language, it
applies to drawing a distinction between factors or subjects. Yet in the
context of our discussion-that of morality and law- "discrimination"
refers to actions that are socially unacceptable, often immoral, and at
times illegal. Discrimination must go beyond the broad category of
conduct that is arbitrary or generally unfair. Thus, a different, more
precise, definition is required.
There are several analytical responses to the challenge of defining
discrimination in the normative sense. One broadly accepted definition
states that such discrimination must be focused on a specific "social
'4 See Tal Z. Zarsky, Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L.
REV. 1375 (2014).
1 For a similar move and justification for such limitations, see id. at 1380.
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group," or even a "salient social group."1 6 Defining the meaning of such
a "group" in this context is a challenge of its own. On the simplest level,
it refers to relatively well-defined and accepted groupings within
society-such as gender or nationality (and of course even the
identification of these groups raises questions as to how they must be
defined-issues I set aside at this point). What constitutes such a group
is no doubt an open and dynamic question. As such, this definition
must currently be expanded to include distinctions related to social
status, family structure and physical condition.
In view of the open-ended and potentially broad nature of this
definition, many scholars call for further limiting the understanding of
discrimination to instances in which the social group is "salient"-a
concept which also requires some unpacking.17 Salience could be
understood from at least two perspectives. First, a grouping attribute
could be salient to the public in general, or to the "reasonable person." 18
Such salience will be dictated by social trends (which might change over
time). It will also be greatly affected by cognitive factors and
limitations. Some attributes (e.g. skin color, gender) are easily grasped
and considered. Others (such as being left-handed or having a specific
blood type) are hidden or complex, and therefore fall outside this
definition of salience.
Another way to understand "salience" (and thus define
"discrimination") is from the group members' perspectives. A salient
social group will be considered as such when membership in the group
is an important element in the individual's definition of the self. While
similar, this distinction does not fully overlap with the previous one.
Clearly, there are instances in which attributes are both important to
the individual and are used for social grouping as well-such as religion,
nationality, gender and sexual orientation. However, some elements
16 Natalie Stoljar, Intersectionality, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE ETHICS OF
DISCRIMINATION 68 (Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen ed., 2017) (citing Andrew Altman and
others); Peter Vallentyne, Rights, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE ETHICS OF
DISCRIMINATION 132 (Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen ed., 2017). On the other hand, Stoljar
notes scholars that find that this is not a necessary prerequisite and that discrimination
could also be considered differentiating on the basis of hair or eye color.
17 Lippert-Rasmussen refers to instances in which membership is important as it structures
social interactions. This definition is ambiguous as well and will benefit from the
additional analysis in the text that follows. See Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Introduction,
in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE ETHICS OF DISCRIMINATION 2 (Kasper Lippert-
Rasmussen ed., 2017).
is See Frej Klem Thomsen, Direct Discrimination, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE
ETHICS OF DISCRIMINATION 25-26 (Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen ed., 2017).
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might prove central to the individual but will not be generally used for
social grouping, such as attractiveness or affiliation with sport teams.
In addition to the noted criterion, the definition of discrimination
is further narrowed by some scholars stating that the social group in
question must be one that has been subjected to injustice and even
subordination in the past.19 Therefore, race and gender easily fit within
this definition, while other categories such as age or obesity set forth
difficult questions. Other commentators go even further to explain a
finding of "discrimination" requires a power imbalance between the
decider and those subjected to the decision, rendering the discussion
context-specific (as further detailed below).20 The extent to which the
specific group is insulated can also be considered as an important
factor.
For most of this Essay and for the sake of simplicity, the analysis
will focus on the "classic" forms of social groups which receive the
attention of both law and scholarship-minorities defined by race. The
argument can, however, quite easily be applied to other forms of
"protected groups" as classified by religion, gender or sexual
orientation. Section 2.3 below will briefly step outside of this analytic
comfort zone and examine the applicability of the noted theories to
other forms of groups.
Prior to concluding this segment of the discussion, it is important
to note that defining an action as discriminatory carries with it
substantial consequences. When found to be discriminatory, actions
are often prohibited by public and private entities alike (with the
exclusion of personal activities within one's closest inner circle).21
Furthermore, those engaging in such activities are often sanctioned by
law and castigated by society. Thus, defining discrimination must be
done with care, as the consequences of over- or under-exclusiveness are
dire. Defining discrimination too narrowly might allow unacceptable
forms of conduct to slip between the regulatory cracks. In addition,
narrow definitions might lack the flexibility of capturing new forms of
unacceptable discriminatory conduct. On the other hand, the definition
19 Patrick Shin, Race, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE ETHICS OF DISCRIMINATION
203 (Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen ed., 2017). See also DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS
DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 37 (2011).
20 Deborah Hellman, Meaning, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE ETHICS OF
DISCRIMINATION 103-04 (Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen ed., 2017).
21 But see Hugh Collins, Private Life, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE ETHICS OF
DISCRIMINATION 361 (Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen ed., 2017) (explaining that anti-
discrimination law is mostly applied to the public sphere).
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must not be overbroad. The law must refrain from needlessly
interfering with the discretion of private parties conducting their
affairs22 (and to some limited extent provide the state with some
discretion as well), and thus possibly curb innovation. Furthermore,
defining discrimination too broadly might dilute the crucial core
principles of equality and contribute to legitimizing actions society
certainly finds objectionable. This will occur when courts and
regulators allow for some forms of newly-defined "discrimination" to
transpire, given the internal balancing all anti-discrimination rules
entail, and with that, allow the public to believe that other core notions
of discrimination could be compromised and eventually allowed as
well. For these reasons, the anti-discrimination rules decided upon
must be drafted and implemented with precision and sufficient
theoretical backing-a task we turn to now.
B. Why is Discrimination Wrong, and of Which Form?
In liberal societies, many forms of discriminatory practices (even
those found acceptable not long ago) generate a strong visceral sense of
repulsion. Yet it is important to articulate what we find unacceptable in
discriminatory conduct or outcomes, and why. The results of such an
inquiry will prove essential when unpacking questions arising in novel
contexts, such as predictive analytics and data driven processes.
Very broadly speaking, it is helpful to set forth two sets of
arguments to justify anti-discrimination policy: deontological, or
expressive, arguments which focus on the intention of the actor, and
consequentialist arguments focusing on the outcomes and wrongs of
the discriminatory practice.23 A deontological justification will focus on
actions which are driven by the actor's intention to treat one group
differently (for a variety of reasons), without attaching substantial
concern as to whether the specific group ends up worse off due to these
actions. On the other hand, a consequentialist justification will be
motivated by concerns regarding the discriminatory outcomes and the
fact that one group received inferior treatment or was allocated less or
See id. for a discussion of the shift of anti-discrimination laws into the private sphere.
23 See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases,
Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 154 (1992) (noting this
distinction as the basis for anti-discrimination considerations). For a general attempt to
bridge these two concepts, see EYAL ZAMIR & BARAK MEDINA, LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
MORALry (2010).
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lesser goods, rather than examining the intentions which led to this
result.
This dichotomy will dominate the following discussion though it is
not without its shortcomings, as the noted distinction is somewhat
messy. For instance, according to some theories the extent of the intent
has an impact on the actual harms the affected individual suffers and
therefore this deontological theory relies on some outcome-based
justifications.24 Nonetheless, the elegance of this taxonomy facilitates
the analysis quite effectively, and therefore, the noted inaccuracies
could be forgiven.
The deontological arguments rely on several forms of justifications
and can also be referred to as those concerned with "disparate intent."
They are of greatest force when referring to the explicit actions of public
entities and the government, which are not the focus of this current
discussion. However, deontological arguments are nonetheless still
relevant to the actions of private parties-especially those in a position
of power and influence. On the most basic level, it is broadly argued
that judging people as having inferior moral worth is intrinsically
wrong,25 and that actions based on such judgment are unfair.26 Note
however, that often (and especially in the context of predictive
analytics) discriminatory intent need not reflect bigotry. Rather, it
might result from the willingness to cater to discriminatory preferences
of others, or an attempt to abuse previously noted vulnerabilities of the
relevant social groups. These instances are still considered to constitute
unfair discrimination, yet other intent-based justifications are required
to explain why.
Another popular deontological theory focuses on the demeaning
nature of such discriminatory intentions and the actions that follow.
This notion has two aspects:27 one subjective in the mind of the decider,
24 See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 20, at 105 (arguing that discrimination is demeaning- an
outcome affected by intention).
25 See Alexander, supra note 23, at 159.
26 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES AND STEREOTYPES, 203-04 (2003).
27 Erin Beeghly, Respect, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE ETHICS OF DISCRIMINATION
84-85 (Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen ed. 2017). She also notes a third notion of "deliberative
disrespect" forwarded by Benjamin Eidelman. According to this theory, disrespect follows
from not considering the possible arguments the person discriminated against can set
forth. While this interesting argument might still stand in the algorithmic setting, it might
be too far-fetched to subject deciding individuals and entities to such a normative
requirement.
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and one objective. The former aspect refers to the unacceptable nature
of the allocator's conduct. The latter aspect pertains to the actual
actions and policies implemented and whether they are perceived as
demeaning by the affected parties, as well as the public in general.
Here, context will play a central role and establishing these theoretical
elements in practice will prove challenging. 28
A final deontological justification states that discrimination is
wrong given the fact that it resulted from policies which treat
individuals as mere segments within broader groups,29 and in that way,
undermines the individual's freedom.30 Note this justification suffers
from a severe flaw,31 as individuals are always considered as part of a
group when subjected to decisions (especially in the context of
allocations). This is because all human decisions rely on some form of
generalization-the practice of placing an individual or an event within
a broader group. For instance, considering the plausibility of specific
facts, claims and actions regarding one person requires comparing that
specific individual's qualities and attributes with those of other
individuals and phenomena the decider encountered in the past.
Beyond the deontological aspects, consequentialist arguments
focus on the unique harm of the discriminatory conduct or on the
"disparate impact". On the most basic level, the prohibition and
limitation of discrimination is justified given the fact that it leads to
inequality among the distinguished groups and might prove to be a
strong proxy for discriminatory intent.32 Yet to be considered
discriminatory, the outcome often requires something more. Indeed,
the law has singled out only several specific contexts in which disparate
28 Ronen Avraham, Insurance, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE ETHICS OF
DISCRIMINATION 340 (Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen ed., 2017) (musing whether a minor hike
in pension payments should be considered demeaning).
29 See Sarah Goff, Discrimination in the Job Market, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
THE ETHICS OF DISCRIMINATION 3o7-o8 (Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen ed., 2017).
30 See Julie Suk, Affirmative Action, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE ETHICS OF
DISCRIMINATION 397 (Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen ed., 2017) (referring to the work of
Moreau and Eidelson).
31 See SCHAUER, supra note 26, at 86-87.
32 Larry Alexander & Kevin Cole, Discrimination by Proxy, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 453, 456
(1997).
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impact is prohibited,33 and from these instances various justifications
can be derived.
Discrimination is deemed unlawful and intervention is justified
when it promotes negative stereotypes regarding specific social
groups.34 Such stereotypes would most likely unfold and persist when
the discriminated group was subjected to prejudice in the past, and
thus, these stereotypes are still salient in society. The troubles of
spreading negative stereotypes also unfold when such stereotyping is
easily and quickly derived from the discriminatory practice. This, in
turn, is a result of the noted cognitive feature of the human mind. 35 For
example, stereotyping will most likely follow when a specific racial
factor is used, or when a clear outcome of racial separation and
segregation publicly unfolds. Furthermore, a discriminatory outcome
should be prohibited when it might lead to subordination3 6 and
seclusion of specific social groups. 37 Such outcomes will unfold when
the allocated resources are important and contribute to the structuring
of society - for instance, decisions and allocations related to
employment and housing.3 8
To conclude, the justifications for discrimination are complex and
vague rather than simple.39 It is, therefore, no surprise that while
discrimination is a general term, the complexity of anti-discrimination
theory requires context-specific approaches. For instance, the contexts
of employment, housing, and credit were singled out as those that
33 For a review, see Zarsky, supra note 14, at 1398.
34 Alexander & Cole, supra note 33, at 457.
3s Thus, the problem with stereotypes indeed begins when they are externalized - or begin
reproducing themselves throughout the world. See Andrew Koppelman, Justice for Large
Earlobes! A Comment on Richard Arneson's "What Is Wrongful Discrimination?," 43 SAN
DiEGo L. REv. 809, 813 (2006).
36 See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data's Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
671, 724 (2016).
37 SCHAUER, supra note 26, at 189.
38 Collins, supra note 21, at 365.
39 Alexander, supra note 23.
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require specific rules and approaches, while others provide less
restrictive interventions.40
III. THE "ANALYTIC" CHALLENGE: RECONSIDERING DISCRIMINATION
THEORY
The noted theoretical justifications do a reasonable job explaining
and justifying why discriminatory practices of the past are
unacceptable. Adapting them to the algorithmic age requires some
tinkering. Before explaining why that is and how it could be done,
consider two examples to guide us through the following discussion
(which are mostly premised on actual events and practices):
Example A: FinBank Inc. is a subsidiary of a large commercial bank
which has chosen to introduce novel methods for providing credit and
operates in a competitive environment. One such credit allocation
model structures a credit score on the basis of the meta-data their
costumers' cell phone operators provide them with (after the
customers gave their explicit consent), which includes location data,
as well as insights to the users' social network. An ex post analysis of
the outcomes of this credit allocation model showed that the algorithm
used recommended limiting credit to individuals whofrequent specific
geographical areas - zones mostly populated by minorities. In
addition,further analysis found that the cell phone meta-data was far
richer for affluent users who had extensive data plans. This practice
led to tainted results indicating better credit recommendations for
these affluent users.
Example B: AllLife is a small insurance company which began using
predictive analytics to tailor premium pricing to customers for their
health and life insurance products. In doing so, they apply algorithms
which strive to identify risk factors that lead to a shorter life span and
health complications, using a data driven process. In other words,
algorithms work through datasets to set up predictive models which
are later applied to price the premiums of new customers. These
datasets were closely inspected to assure they properly represent the
entire corpus ofcurrent and prospective clients. Nonetheless, an after-
the-fact analysis showed that (1) this process led to higher premiums
40 For the context of employment, see The Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2oooe-2000e-17 (2012); for the context of housing, see The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-19; Richard J. Arneson, What Is Wrongful Discrimination?, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
775, 778 (2oo6); for the context of credit, see Packin & Lev-Aretz, supra note 2, at 353.
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for minorities (2) the process revealed interesting correlations related
to other factors such as veganism, or the tendency to take short naps
in the afternoon, and health-related outcomes. These lifestyle factors
were factored into the predictive analytics decision-making process
for premium setting and calculation.
A. Challenges to the Deontological Arguments - and Quick Responses
1. The "Intent" Hook
Should any of the noted practices detailed in the examples be
considered as unacceptable discrimination on the basis of the noted
deontological justifications? Before directly addressing this issue, it is
first important to re-visit the central notion of "intent". Finding an
intentional "hook" to the noted practices is somewhat of a challenge. It
is fair to assume that these practices do not feature explicitly blatant
discrimination, which is driven by bigotry or prejudice. Therefore,
justifications which rely upon intentional consideration of some groups
to be of lower moral worth are probably of very limited relevance in
these contexts.41 Furthermore, given the public's distaste for such
conduct, very rarely will groups be specifically and intentionally
differentiated on the basis of a factor defining a salient social group.
Even though "classic" forms of intent are unlikely to unfold, other,
subtler forms of intent are quick to surface. At first, algorithmic
designers might subconsciously structure models in a discriminatory
manner. While indirect, this form of intent nonetheless discriminates
against group members because they are members of this group, and
therefore, are indeed problematic.42 Given the limited human
intervention in the process, these instances will also prove rare. They
might, indeed, unfold, while the analysts make subtle decisions as to
whether specific correlations and findings should be weeded out and
considered as a mere fluke or error, or applied to the final algorithm.
Therefore, audit logs must document the process of structuring and
running the predictive algorithms. When discriminatory outputs are
found, these logs must be examined for evidence of such human-driven
biases and their outcomes.
41 RICHARD FORD, THE RACE CARD 18o (2008). But see Barocas & Selbst, supra note 36, at
692 (noting the notion of "masking").
42 See Zarsky, supra note 14, at 1391. For additional sources on subconscious
discrimination, see Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious
Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 741 (2005).
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Furthermore, discriminatory intent will most likely be reflected in
three specific manifestations which must now be considered and
accounted for: (i) recklessly distinguishing between groups while
applying factors which are clearly proxies for protected groups; (2)
recklessly relying on problematic and tainted sources; and (3)
recklessly relying on automated decision-making systems, which
mimic prior human behavior known to be discriminatory and biased.
Recognizing these aspects pushes the boundaries of culpability, yet is
necessary to consider, given technological changes.
The noted Example A can further demonstrate and explain these
novel forms of potential intent. Here, FinBank did not show any clear
intention to discriminate, nor is there any indication of subconscious
intentions. However, several forms of culpability could nonetheless be
identified. FinBank applied an algorithm, that singled out a specific
geographical area which proved to be a proxy for race. By neglecting to
examine whether the geographical areas used were indeed such a
proxy, FinBank committed a culpable omission. Indeed, geographical
areas have often been found to be strongly correlated with race.
Therefore, neglecting to examine the nature of the geographical zone
selected for differentiation is normatively unacceptable and should fall
within "intentional" forms of discrimination.43 Other situations, such
as the use of specific names for distinguishing among recipients in
allocation processes, would be suspect as well and their prohibition
easily justified under these "intentional" theories.44
Furthermore, culpability and thus intent might arise from
FinBank's reckless reliance on a tainted dataset which led to
discriminatory outcomes. Indeed, predictions can only be as good as
the data they rely upon (a notion best encapsulated in the computer
science axiom "garbage in - garbage out."45). Reckless discrimination
might follow from reliance on datasets which systematically over-
represent (or underrepresent) negative (or positive) behavioral
attributes of a specific social group. In this example, FinBank applied
the cell phone metadata without correcting it for predictable biases
which might result from the collection process - a culpable omission
43 For more on the justifications for prohibiting the use of "blatant proxies," see Zarsky,
supra note 14, at 1394.
44 See Sweeney, supra note 11, at 34.
45 Garbage in, Garbage out, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Garbage-in,_garbage-out [https://perma.ce/TB94-FFTF].
[Vol 14.124
ZARSKY
which results in a new form of intent. If the example here noted were
to unfold, the relevant firm could not argue that the standard here set
is too high and that it cannot be expected to foresee these
complications. This is because similar prediction models and their
problems have already been noted in the literature of the credit
context.46 In addition, the systematic errors mentioned have also been
discussed in similar settings.47 Indeed, revelations regarding the
fallibility of machine learning4 8 and other forms of automated decisions
place the onus on the relevant firms to show they have not acted
recklessly in these contexts.
A similar argument could be made with regard to the firm's
potential reliance on machine learning techniques, which mimic
human-based decisions which were known to be discriminatory given
past complaints. Neglecting to correct the discriminatory outcomes
could, at times, be equated to intentionally applying a discriminatory
algorithm, when such actions are to be expected. In this example,
FinBank cannot structure a machine learning algorithm which will
learn from the practices and decisions of its parent-bank credit officers,
if these have been known to systematically and intentionally
discriminate against minorities. Recklessly duplicating intentional
discriminatory practices of the past should be considered as
intentionally discriminatory practices at the present.
2. Deontological Justifications
After understanding what forms of intent might prove relevant to
predictive analytics environments, it is now the time to establish which
forms of discriminatory intent should be considered prohibited and
why. The central intent-based justifications for anti-discrimination
norms and policy - those stating that it is unacceptable to judge groups
to be of a lower moral worth - seem irrelevant to the predictive
analytics context as those operating the algorithms most likely do not
take such a moral stand. Therefore, we must turn to the next central
justification and examine whether the actions noted are demeaning.
When doing so, let us assume that the nature of the algorithm's
outcome is evidently made public and acknowledged, even though the
46 Packin & Lev-Aretz, supra note 2, at 359.
47 Kate Crawford, The Hidden Biases in Big Data, HARv. Bus. REV. (Apr. 1, 2013),
https://hbr.org/2013/o4/the-hidden-biases-in-big-data [https://perma.cc/CXG-ZXB8].
48 See Sweeney, supra note 11, at 34.
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process might take place in a "black box." A highly secretive algorithm
might arguably not prove demeaning, as its actions and outcomes are
unknown. Given the "leaky" nature of the information society and
economy, it is, nonetheless, fair to assume that such information will
eventually make its way to the public and thus generate the
"demeaning" dynamic. This will be especially pronounced in
commercial contexts, as discussed in the examples.
Here, it is important to address the noted intricacies of the
"demeaning" justification, which has both objective and subjective
aspects. In general, demeaning/disrespect-based arguments are
analytically weak in algorithmic settings in which the decisions are data
driven.49 The objective aspects are especially unconvincing; one can
seriously question whether members of the social group will find the
automated processes singling them out demeaning and disrespectful.
Arguably, such sentiments best describe feelings individuals have
towards other individuals, as opposed to sentiments towards artifacts,
such as computers. Of course, and as explained, the so-called
automated actions of FinBank have resulted from the actions and
omissions of the firm's executives, data analysts, and programmers.
However, this deep understanding of the data analytics practices is not
most likely shared with the general public. Here, given its general
ignorance on this matter, one can speculate that the public will
probably not feel "insulted" or "demeaned" by the actions of the
executives driving the actions addressed in the noted examples. These
crucial questions undermine the application of the "demeaning" based
justification to this context.
However, the "demeaning" justification might carry more weight
when considering its "subjective" aspects. This theoretical element
concerns the actual actions and omissions of FinBank's employees - as
opposed to how they are perceived. As explained, FinBank certainly
could have taken steps to limit the discriminatory outcome. Failing to
do so, at least when such steps are obvious and the results of the
discrimination are predictable and substantial, should be considered as
demeaning and thus justifiably discriminatory.
An additional dimension to remember when considering this
justification is the nature and extent of the interaction between the
relevant parties. Some scholars state that even an intentional
discriminatory act can hardly be considered demeaning if it is a one
49 See Beeghly, supra note 27, at 88 (stating this is true even in the simpler context of
"statistical discrimination"). For more on this latter term, see SCHAUER, supra note 26, at
117-18.
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time or isolated encounter. Other factors noted are the power
relationships between the parties. On its face, the relations noted
represent power imbalances between mere individuals and large
corporations, which provide social and even public-like services to the
masses. However, Example A provides an interesting wrinkle as it
notes the actions of a small and innovative subsidiary of a bank,
operating within a broad and competitive industry. Thus, given
alternatives and competitive forces, the individual's encounter with the
bank might prove to be a one time and isolated event, which does not
feature a substantial power imbalance.5o In such a case, the justification
for applying anti-discrimination policy is substantially decreased.
However, applying regulation to medium-size insurance firms
(Example B) could be easier to justify.
A final caveat is due here; the noted apparent competitive
environment might, in fact, be concentrated in a specific, yet relevant
sense. Even though a variety of firms are offering credit services, it is
possible that they are applying the same predictive algorithms,
provided by the same firms, which feature the same flaws. When a
specific software support system dominates the market, discriminatory
practices might easily be considered to be demeaning.
The theoretical discussion presented thus far can have several
implications. It can clarify in which instances anti-discrimination
norms and laws are called for. It can also provide insights as to the
appropriate remedies which should be set in place to enforce them.
Generally, the law can provide two forms of remedies while taking a
regulatory or a tort-based approach. A regulatory approach will single
out specific instances of unacceptable discrimination, move to prohibit
these practices, and require firms to cease such actions, when apparent.
A potential shortcoming of this option is that it does not generate
substantial incentives for firms and their executives to strive to
minimize discriminatory outcomes, ex ante, but only after the fact. As
long as their actions could be reasonably justified, such firms need not
actively scrutinize their actions out of fear that discriminatory
outcomes would lead to liability.5
50 See Carina Fourie, Anti-discriminatory Informal Norms, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK
OF THE ETHICS OF DISCRIMINATION 426-27 (Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen ed., 2017)
(explaining that scholars do not find such instances to justify anti-discrimination policy).
5' Note, however, that even though this legal path might not entail the imposition of
damages, it can certainly generate substantial losses to a firm found to be discriminating.
These might result from the costs of regulatory scrutiny and after the fact compliance, as
well as the reputational damages (which might even lead to consumer boycotts and other
sanctions which are easily mobilized in the digital age) that might follow from the
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An alternative route would be that of imposing ex post liability
(which could lead to the payment of damages) when discriminatory
conduct is apparent - similarly to that imposed in general tort law.52
Such a route would generate strong incentives for firms to engage in ex
ante steps to limit their prospective liability.53 The challenge with
applying such liability scheme, however, is the notion of culpability, or
lack thereof. A finding of culpability is closely linked to deontological
justifications and the "intentional" hook. If the theories (drawn out
above) seeking out a culpability "hook" of discriminatory intent fail,
imposing such extensive tort liability (and the right to sue for damages)
is a challenge. And while tort law certainly does feature strict or
absolute liability doctrines (which do not require a finding of
culpability), these are applied in specific settings which feature high
risks or important policy objectives (such as protecting consumers from
defective products).54 Tort liability without culpability should not be
easily expanded to the contexts of anti-discrimination policy, which
feature somewhat abstract harms. Therefore, the quest for finding a
proper theory of culpability pertaining to the actions of those practicing
predictive analytics should also prove crucial for applying stricter tort-
like remedies.
Finally, consider the abovementioned deontological argument
justifying anti-discrimination policy given the treatment of individuals
as mere segments within groups. It is unclear whether this general
argument is mitigated or perhaps aggravated by the shift to predictive
analytics. Indeed, some individuals might find comfort in the (mostly
illusionary) notion that they are merely rejected by a computer, rather
revelations that such firms indeed engaged in discriminatory conduct. Still, such costs
might provide insufficient incentives for motivating substantial ex ante initiatives to block
discriminatory outcomes when applying predictive models.
52 Tarunabh Khaitan, Indirect Discrimination, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE
ETHICS OF DISCRIMINATION 40 (Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen ed., 2017) (explaining the
connection between negligence and the tort of discrimination).
53 Firms might strive to insure against this risk, yet nonetheless the firms will be subjected
to the relevant supervision and requirements of the insurance firms regarding these
matters.
54 See Jules L. Coleman, The Morality of Strict Tort Liability, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 259,
268-70 (1976) (explaining that in specific categories the law has introduced exceptions and
allowed for collecting damages without finding fault).
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than subjected to the insult derived from a human rejection.55 Others
might have a different view. They might find automated grouping and
scoring to be highly offensive to the individual's autonomy. The big data
and predictive analytics environment, therefore, tends to further
complicate the application of this justification, possibly leading to an
analytic dead end. However, the predictive analytics context allows for
formulating a simple response as to the question regarding this
justification's relevance, or lack thereof, to the current discussion (as
well as its analytical strength). As noted in the introduction, other fields
of theoretical inquiry are currently examining the rise of predictive
analytics. One such specific area pertains to autonomy risks brought
about by automated and autonomous decisions.56 It is clear that this
noted justification should be disconnected from the "discrimination"-
based debate, and applied to this, other academic and policy-based
discussion as to the regulation of predictive analytics.
To conclude, predictive analytics present a challenge to the
acceptable understanding of intentional discrimination. Therefore,
novel and broader forms of culpability must be considered. When
found to be relevant they might then be applied to justify protection
from specific forms of differentiation as well as the forms of remedies
made available to those harmed by the discriminatory acts.
B. Challenges to the Consequential Arguments - and Quick Responses
The previous discussion demonstrated that relying on intent-based
arguments to justify anti-discrimination policies in predictive analytic
environments is proving to be a substantial challenge. Consequentialist
arguments prove to be a better fit, at least in some cases and for some
theories. Such theories can be applied when the "intentional" hook is
absent or difficult to establish. Applying such theories to the predictive
analytics context presents specific wrinkles and notable analytical
points of their own.
First, consider the justification for intervention to limit
stereotyping and stigma for protected groups. A data driven process
which has a discriminatory outcome might enhance existing stigma and
55 For a presentation of both views, see discussion in Zarsky, supra note 7, at 320.
56 See Tal Z. Zarsky, Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age ofBig Data, 47 SETON HALL L.
REV. 995, 1015 (2017); Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Luciano Floridi, Why a Right
to Explanation ofAutomated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data
Protection Regulation, 7 INT'L DATA PRIVACY L. 76,97 (2017).
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stereotypes regarding protected groups. Generally, such stigma might
have substantial adverse effects on the social group, both internally and
externally. It affects the way group members are viewed by others and
how these members consider themselves. The strengthening of an
existing stereotype in one context often impacts the way group
members are treated in other social settings. Furthermore, it also
directly affects the way group members evaluate themselves, at times
lowering their aspirations and productivity.57
A process's automated nature might arguably exacerbate this
concern. To explain and demonstrate, let us return to the noted
examples. Here, when the automated system indicates differential
treatment towards a minority group given existing patterns and
correlations, the public will perceive such a finding as one that
strengthens negative prejudice regarding this group. The automated
nature of the process might, in fact, further enhance this perception.
The public will, most likely, not discount this finding and the process
applied in its wake as to be one that is premised on bigotry and existing
biases (as indeed might be the case). Given its automated nature, the
public will rather consider it to result from pure mathematical
reasoning, thus lending it further credence.
For instance, in the context of credit (Example A), a finding that a
specific minority is provided with a poor credit rating will enhance
stereotypes of poor social standing and spill over into other contexts.
Furthermore, the context of insurance (Example B) features similar
problems, as those within groups considered to be "riskier" might be
stigmatized in other contexts outside that of health and life insurance.
Beyond these examples, other situations might generate this concern,
and therefore, might require novel legal responses (even though they
are not addressed in current law or backed by other theories). For
instance, predictive analytics tools are at times used for tailoring
advertising and marketing. The economic implications of slightly
marking up prices for chosen products to a specific group and providing
said group with some ads rather than others might be benign. However,
the symbolic impact could be substantial. Therefore, discriminatory
outcomes in this retail-related context should be prohibited as well in
accordance to this justification.
A possible mitigating factor which might limit the relevance of this
justification to the context at hand would be the process's inherent
opacity, and the fact that its discriminatory outcome (and thus the
stigmatizing elements derived from it) would be evident only after
57 Alexander, supra note 23, at 162.
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further study and inspection. However, the discriminatory nature of
automated processes is constantly being revealed and in a variety of
contexts.58 Therefore, this opacity element might not prove mitigating
after all.
The strength of the stereotyping/stigma justification depends on
the relevant context. As noted, stereotyping requires existing salience
of the group and the noted traits as well as visibility of the
discriminatory practice. This clearly transpires when discriminatory
outcomes flow from the actions of the government or major private
parties. Yet what of the examples noted, in which relatively small or
medium-size private parties generate discriminatory outcomes while
applying predictive analytics? The general argument, according to
which anti-discrimination policy requires a power-based
relationship,59 has some merit in this context, and therefore, in specific
circumstances, the noted stigma-based justification need not hold. The
linkage between the size and influence of the entity and the noted
stigma concern could be articulated as follows: for a stigma to spread
and cause real damage, the entity asserting the stigmatizing position
needs to be of substantial social standing and dominance as it must
prove to have some influence in a public debate. Small startups
applying exploratory models can hardly be considered to meet this
criterion, and the effect of their stigmatizing conduct would prove
negligible. Therefore, and generally speaking, this stereotype-based
justification must call for excluding such small firms from anti-
discrimination policy.
As noted in the previous discussion regarding intent,60 several
caveats are called for. First, if an abundance of small entities are
applying the same software tools and generating similar outcomes, a
stigma might indeed stick, and the prohibition of the practices is
justified. Second, even private firms can substantially promote
stereotypes regardless of their size - for instance, firms carrying out
crucial social roles. Consider again Example B and the context of
insurance. Insurance markets are highly regulated and perform the
crucial social role of spreading risk. The actions of these firms can
58 For a discussion of this phenomenon in the governmental context, see Tal Z. Zarsky,
Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REv. 1503, 1514, 1567 (2013). See also Yochai
Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle Over the Soul of the
Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311, 350 (2011).
59 See Hellman, supra note 20.
60 See Alexander, supra note 23, at 159; SCHAUER, supra note 26.
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potentially generate and enhance negative stigma given the salience of
their voice. In addition, their actions might be considered to reflect
public opinion, regardless of the relevant firm's size. For that reason,
anti-discrimination policy could be justifiably expanded to the
situations noted in Example B.
Next, consider another central consequentialist-based anti-
discrimination justification: the notion of seclusion/exclusion and
subordination. Here, discriminatory outcomes might lead to the
removal and segregation of specific groups from society - a fear
especially potent with groups which have suffered such removal or
subordination in the past.6 1 This concern might snowball into other
social crises such as social disengagement, lack of trust, and eventually
greater inequality.62 The strength of this argument does not seem to be
affected by the shift to the realm of algorithmic predictions - as it
focuses on actual outcomes rather than the process they entail.
This latter justification's central shortcoming is its limited
relevance. Very few forms of discrimination can be truly considered to
contribute to the structuring of society. Employment, housing, and
credit are solid examples of decisions where this concern is valid -
whether decisions are carried by human or machine. However, one
might nonetheless question whether Example A features a situation in
which policy intervention is justified according to this theory. On the
one hand, it discusses the allocation of credit, yet on the other, FinBank
is merely one of several relevant entities. Here again carve outs and
exemptions for smaller firms might be justified. Furthermore, the
noted Example B, also does not seem to provide a good fit for applying
the noted justification, as insurance (or lack thereof) does not
necessarily have a structural effect on society (although if hard pressed,
an argument as to the broader role insurance actually has could be
proposed). 63
C. Beyond "Salient Social Groups"
Predictive analytics can generate endless options and variations of
social groupings for potential differentiation. For instance, these can be
61 SCHAUER, supra note 26, at 189; See also Richard Primus, The Future ofDisparate
Impact, io8 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1347 (2010).
62 See Zarsky, supra note 14, at 1399.
63 For instance, that the lack of insurance inhibits the ability to participate in some social
practices or take risks.
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premised on the individuals' shopping habits, reading interests and
sleeping schedules. In doing so, they might rely on an abundance of
factors and the interactions between them. Should any of these new
possible forms of social group be prohibited in accordance to the
existing anti-discrimination justifications (yet not necessarily
doctrine)? This last segment briefly addresses this cutting edge and
vexing question. Note, however, these forms of sorting might
nonetheless be found normatively unacceptable according to other
theories, including that of equality, which will not be discussed here.
As noted, the key prerequisite for the consideration of a specific
distinction as part of anti-discrimination theory is that it pertains to a
"salient social group." This foundational element is the key to the
various justifications noted. As explained above, defining such "groups"
could be done in accordance with either an objective or subjective
theory.64
It is questionable whether the rise of predictive analytics will
substantially change the subjective view of salient social groups.
Indeed, novel differentiating factors could be introduced, but these will
not necessarily impact the way an individual views and categorizes him-
or herself. There are, however, several parameters which individuals
might find central for their self-definition and identity structure, which
were not usually applied as factors for differentiation in allocation up
until recently, due to lack of interest, ability, or sufficient data. For
instance, note the facts of Example B, which features an insurance
company relying on veganism as a discriminating factor; an element
which usually is not central to discrimination-based discussions. Yet
today, in the age of "Big Data," novel data collection techniques might
enable establishing the veganism factor (such as through consumption
records) and applying it in various contexts to differentiate among
individuals. It is fair to assume that this personal parameter might be
central to an individual's self-definition. 65 Therefore, the law must be
open to introducing additional elements into the list of "social group,"
that should be part of anti-discrimination policy, as discriminating on
their basis might prove both demeaning and stigmatizing - the two
leading justifications noted above.
64 See Stoljar, supra note 16; Lippert-Rasmussen, supra note 17; Thomsen, supra note 18;
Shin, supra note 19; Hellman, supra note 20.
65 For a discussion of the centrality of veganism to one's identity, see Elizabeth Cherry,
Veganism as a Cultural Movement: A Relational Approach, 5 Soc. MOVEMENT STUD. 155,
155-56 (2006).
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Yet there are limits to the expansion of the extent of the concept of
salient social groups. To demonstrate, consider again Example B which
also noted discrimination on the basis of sleeping habits. While
gathering information regarding this parameter is now possible (for
instance through various wearables, or indications of cell phone usage
or movement), it cannot be considered central to the individual's self-
determination. Therefore, discrimination on the basis of this factor
should not be considered as part of the anti-discrimination debate. 66
Finally, consider the alternative perspective for defining salient
social groups (which might be subjected to discrimination) - through
an analysis of the objective view of salient social trends. The human
ability and tendency to group individuals together might be on the
verge of substantial change. The age of predictive analytics will most
likely impact the way humans perceive the world. As opposed to one
that is broken down along the crude lines of race, gender, age, religions,
etc., it would be one that provides for far more nuanced distinctions,
which rely on new salient parameters.
Is it reasonable to argue that cognitive methods developed over
thousands of years will quickly change given the availability of new
technological measures? Several studies and news articles have
indicated how the use of Google has affected the way we think and use
our brains, especially with regard to how and what we remember.67 It
is therefore not far-fetched to hypothesize that the availability of novel
sorting methods will, over time, indeed change the way people sort and
differentiate - and thus consider social groupings.
The noted change in social sorting might lead to vast advantages, as
society will prove more innovative and agile in the way it grasps
potential allocations. Yet, there might also be a downside; society will
consider applying new forms of systematic discrimination, which will
now prove extremely harmful given the various psychological and
sociological dynamics addressed throughout this Essay. Therefore,
policy and lawmakers must constantly track new social trends, and if
66 For a similar discussion, see Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Private Discrimination: A
Prioritarian, Desert-Accommodating Account, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 817, 824, 856 (2006)
(explaining that having green eyes is irrelevant in almost any social context and thus,
should be considered as the basis of unacceptable discrimination, as opposed to religion or
sex).
67 Alexis Sobel, How Google is Changing the Way We Think, HUFFINGTON POST, (Aug. 25,
2015,12:48 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/google-changes-
thinkingus-J5dc8o6e4bo4ae497046fa6 [https://perma.c/S4HF-DMKS]; Stephanie
Thomson, Scientists Say Google is Changing Our Brains, WORLD ECON. F. (Oct. 6, 2016),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2o16/lo/how-google-is-changing-our- brains/
[https://perma.cc/X4FC-HFWQ].
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indeed these new forms of thinking arise, consider appropriate
amendments to the foundations of anti-discrimination policy so to
reflect the protection of these novel groups and social sub-cultures
from these new forms of sorting.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Essay discussed the application of justifications for anti-
discrimination policy to the age of data analytics. The analysis
examined central theories and the changes the new environments bring
about. This Essay presented three central findings, which are highly
relevant to firms engaged in the implementation of predictive analytics
in contexts that substantially impact individuals lives - and calls for at
least considering relevant measures:
(1) In terms of deontological theories - the notion of "intent" and
"culpability" requires some tinkering and adaptation. When such intent
could be found in the predictive analytics context along the lines noted,
a justification based on the "demeaning" nature of the discriminatory
conduct could be applied and anti-discrimination policies must be
introduced and enforced with rigor.
(2) In terms of consequentialist theories - stigma-based theories
can justify legal intervention in specific instances in which negative
stereotypes will have a substantial effect - especially when referring to
groups already discriminated against and applied by entitiese of
prominence.
(3) In terms of defining new social groups, which might be
subjected to discrimination given the rise of novel processes, we must
consider adding distinctions which relate to important factors
individuals rely upon to define themselves, to the existing list of
protected groups. We must also track possible changes in human
cognition that the reliance of predictive analytics might bring about and
their possible effects, which might lead to adding new sub-categories to
anti-discrimination policy.
Discrimination is a loaded concept. While it is intuitively often
mentioned in discussions and debates pertaining to predictive
analytics, examining it thoroughly in this novel context requires
substantial legwork. This Essay strives to provide an initial blueprint
for applying the vast scholarship dedicated to understanding
discrimination to this novel technological and social setting of
"predictive analytics." Yet, this Essay is merely a work in progress. As
the practices evolve and technology proceeds, additional layers of
analysis must follow - a process which must involve technologists,
philosophers, and legal scholars.
20171 35

